Tag Archives: Benton Institute

Are Broadband Prices Dropping?

The FCC recently asked for comments in Docket 26-78, which is the latest iteration of its biennial report to Congress that looks at the State of Competition in the Communications Marketplace. Various industry players provided input to the FCC on issues related to competition and pricing for broadband and cellular service, with fewer caring about voice and cable service.

One of the issues widely discussed in this year’s filing is broadband prices. Some of the big ISPs continue to assert that broadband prices are dropping. For example, USTelecom refers to a report it generated that asserts that Internet prices have fallen for the eleventh straight year. I’ve written about the annual USTelecom reports before, and a big part of their assertion comes from looking at the price over time of the cost per megabit of speed being sold. On that basis, prices are dropping, mostly because ISPs have been increasing the speeds being delivered at a faster pace than prices.

One set of comments came from the Benton Institute, which described the issue perfectly. They cite the example that the price for 200 Mbps was around $50 in 2021. Many ISPs have unilaterally increased speeds without increasing price, and the average price for 400 Mbps in 2025 was also around $50. While the cost per megabit cut in half, customers are still paying $50.

Of course, ISPs don’t sell, and consumers don’t buy broadband by the megabit. Benton made a humorous observation on the big ISP’s focus on cost per megabit. Benton cites a USTelecom comment that the price per megabit for gigabit service is around 7 cents per megabit, or $70 per month. If USTelecom members are happy with that price, then why aren’t they applying that price to slower products so that 200 Mbps would cost $14 per month?

Perhaps the best discussion of prices in the docket comes from a study by John P. Horrigan, PhD, which is attached to the Benton comments. Horrigan takes a neutral look at prices and found that the weighted average for all broadband products increased by 4.8% from 2024 to 2025. Horrigan found that broadband prices for products slower than gigabit declined 8.5% from 2024 to 2025, with prices increasing for faster products.

Horrigan found that low-price options are disappearing from the market. When the ACP plan was operating, 9% pf broadband being sold was priced at $30 or less. He says this fell to just 3% of the market in 2025. This also holds true for plans with slower speeds. In 2022, 57% of consumers were buying Internet at a speed of 100 Mbps or less. In 2025, that has dropped to 32% of the market.

While the Benton Institute comments hint at it, I think most other comments in the docket are missing the bigger picture. Customers are choosing to migrate to lower-cost broadband options. One doesn’t have to look any further than the phenomenal success of FWA cellular. Since 2022, 16.5 million customers have subscribed to FWA cellular. While some of these customers live in rural areas where FWA is the only fast broadband option, I think a vast majority of these folks choose FWA to save money. The list prices for FWA home broadband are in the $50-$60 dollar range. However, there are big discounts for bundling with cellular service and for using autopay, and it’s possible to buy FWA home broadband for as little as $20-$30 per month.

Any analysis that just looks at prices for specific speeds over time will account for folks willing to take less speed for a lower bill. The big ISPs don’t want to talk about this, but there is no other way to discuss the huge success of FWA without talking about customers self-selecting lower prices.

RDOF Defaults

The Benton Institute for Broadband & Society pieced together the statistics for defaults to date on the FCC’s RDOF and CAF II reverse auctions.

The RDOF (Rural Digital Opportunity Fund) was the biggest attempt at the time to solve the rural broadband gap. The FCC had originally slated $20.4 billion to award to ISPs in a reverse auction, meaning the ISP willing to take the smallest subsidy for a given area won the funding. Winners were to collect the funding over 10 years and had up to seven years to build the promised networks.

The program ran into problems in several dramatic ways. First, the FCC chose the areas eligible for RDOF using its badly flawed broadband maps. RDOF was supposed to be awarded to Census blocks where nobody could buy broadband of 25/3 Mbps or faster. Unfortunately, the FCC maps had huge numbers of blocks where ISPs claimed exactly 25/3 Mbps ability, and those areas were not eligible. The non-eligible eventually became most of what is being addressed now with BEAD, which indicates how poor the maps were at the time. In a problem that is still plaguing the BEAD process, the FCC made the funding available in what is best described as a checkerboard of eligible and non-eligible areas.

At the close of the BEAD auction, ISPs had claimed over $9.2 million in RDOF subsidies to serve over 5.2 million locations. Benton has assembled a spreadsheet that shows that 1.9 million of those locations and $3.3 billion were defaulted. The two biggest defaults came from FCC action. The FCC decided that Starlink broadband did not meet the speed goal of the plan, and the FCC canceled $852 million that was to cover 630,000 locations. The FCC canceled awards of $1.3 billion to cover 528,000 locations for LTD Broadband after the FCC decided the company didn’t have the financial and technical ability to fulfill its commitments.

The Benton spreadsheet shows 135 entities that defaulted on BEAD or the CAF II reverse auction. The reason for some of the defaults is obvious. Thirty ISPs won subsidies to build to less than 50 locations. It’s likely that most of them were trying to win larger areas and defaulted because the paperwork burden of complying with RDOF wasn’t worth the tiny amount of subsidy.

The other major reason for defaults is the amount of subsidy. The average award for the defaulted areas is $1,732 in RDOF subsidy per location, paid out over ten years. Starlink had asked for $1,353 per location. LTD Broadband won awards of $2,501 per location. The other awards average out to $1,503 per RDOF location. It’s not hard to imagine ISPS looking at the size of these awards and deciding they couldn’t make the math work – particularly after inflation ballooned due to the pandemic.

As Benton warns, the defaults may not be over. Most of the RDOF winners should have built 40% of their locations by the end of 2024. I’ve been working with a lot of Counties that haven’t seen any progress on RDOF and are wondering if the networks will ever be built. I hope Benton follows up by getting a tally, by State, of where RDOF has already been built. I would assume any ISP that isn’t meeting the 40% obligation is probably a good candidate for additional default.

This all sounds negative, but there have been networks built all over the country from the RDOF funding. Numerous electric cooperatives built networks more quickly than the FCC’s required timeline. Charter was a huge winner and says it is far ahead of schedule on RDOF. Yet risk of further defaults is alarming. I know there are a lot of rural folks who are counting on the remaining RDOF networks being built, because further defaults mean areas with no broadband solution.