Tag Archives: SBC

Promises Made, Promises Broken

I noticed that the Charter/Cox merger has been approved by the FCC, the DOJ, and the Public Service Commission of New York. The final hurdle is the California Public Service Commission, where Charter is hoping to get a decision by August from the CPUC. In exchange for an agreement for the merger, Charter has promised to spend at least $275 million on network upgrades to achieve symmetrical gigabit speeds across its California footprint within three years. Charter also promises to offer a statewide low-income price plan for five years that includes a $20 plan for 100/20 Mbps speeds, and that would be free for Lifeline Pilot participants. Finally, Charter promises to provide $23 million in support to the nonprofit CETF (California Emerging Technology Fund) for digital literacy and device subsidies, plus $7 million to regional broadband groups.

I had a chuckle when I saw the promises being made by Charter. It reminded me of many times that carriers didn’t follow through on big promises made to regulators. One of the most memorable broken promises came from Verizon in Pennsylvania – a story that has been well documented in a book by Bruce Kushnick, The Book of Broken Promises: $400 Billion Broadband Scandal & Free the Net. In 1993, the State agreed to deregulate Verizon and provide big tax breaks as long as Verizon would deliver 45 Mbps broadband service to the entire state by 2015. By the early 2000s, Verizon reneged on the offer and reduced the promised speeds to 1.5 Mbps. Verizon eventually built FiOS fiber in selected urban and suburban markets and ignored the rest of the state. There were some rural Verizon customers who never even got the slow DSL.

In 1999, the two Baby Bell companies SBC and Ameritech, asked to merge. SBC promised regulators that the merger would spark a new, nationally competitive telecommunications carrier and committed to expand beyond its thirteen-state home region. Within a year of the deal closing, the FCC opened an investigation against SBC for failing to meet its competitive entry timelines and because of growing volumes of consumer complaints about declining residential service quality.

When AT&T asked in 2015 to acquire DirecTV for $48.5 billion, the company promised federal regulators to build out more than 12 million high-speed fiber connections. The company quickly fell short of that promise, and many believed that the company was faking fiber passings by counting apartment complexes that were near to its existing fiber network. AT&T eventually decided that building fiber was its best business plan, but it had totally blown off the 2015 promise.

When Charter asked to merge with Time Warner Cable in 2016, the company promised regulators that it would expand its network to unserved rural areas, that it would hold down prices, and would not implement price caps. By 2020, Charter petitioned the FCC to get off the hook for these promises and called them “unduly burdensome”

In 2020, when T-Mobile wanted to buy Sprint for $26 billion, the company promised it would rapidly expand rural 5G coverage. The company also promised to freeze post-paid rate plans for three years. Soon after the merger, the company said the agreement was no longer feasible.

I could fill a few pages with similar stories. Big carriers make whatever promises are needed to get approval for mergers or deregulation, and then typically proceed almost immediately to find ways to get out of what they promised. It’s hard to predict if California will approve the Charter/Cox merger. But I think California fully understands that promises made related to mergers are rarely promises fully kept.

Reflecting on AT&T

I was talking to somebody about AT&T recently – we both worked at the company before the divestiture of the company into the Baby Bells in 1984. This set me to contemplate the odd path the company has taken since the days when it was perhaps the premier U.S. corporation.

AT&T was divested as a long-distance company in 1984 and thrown into a competitive environment where long distance rates and revenues plummeted. AT&T’s fortunes and status decreased to the point where SBC, Southwestern Bell, was able to acquire the company in 2005 while keeping the AT&T brand name.

The reunited Baby Bell companies and AT&T were far diminished from the days when AT&T was at the top of the world. SBC and the other Baby Bells started to cut back on the maintenance and upgrade of copper infrastructure soon after the divestiture. The companies felt emboldened to do this since divestiture also brought the beginning of telephone deregulation. The big telcos were no longer strictly required to meet quality and performance standards, and they responded by trimming technicians and capital repair and upgrade budgets.

During the 1990s, AT&T turned its attention to becoming the largest cellular carrier. The company spent most of its capital in the 1990s on cellular networks, which was timed perfectly with the explosion of the cellular business where practically everybody in the country came to have a cellphone. But even in the cellular world, AT&T didn’t put as much money into its cellular infrastructure and spectrum as its competitors. When AT&T won an exclusive contract to market the iPhone in 2007, it quickly became clear to customers that the AT&T (Cingular at the time) network was inadequate.

AT&T next made several devastatingly bad investments. It bought DirectTV, which then lost half of its customers in a few ensuing years. AT&T was also apparently trying to keep up with Comcast when it spent $100 million to buy Warner Media. A few years later, AT&T unspun this deal and recognized a $47 billion loss to shareholders.

In the last decade, AT&T has been forced to spend a lot of money to upgrade its 4G and 5G networks. While cellular performance has improved dramatically for consumers, 5G still looks like a business plan looking for a revenue stream. Over the last decade, cellular competition has resulted in lower cellular prices for consumers, and it can be argued net 5G revenues for the industry have been a big negative. And now, the biggest cable companies are siphoning off valuable cellular market share.

AT&T and the other big telcos might also be facing an expensive effort to remove lead cables from the environment. Smaller telcos mostly replaced lead cables a long time ago, but it seems the big telcos never quite got around to getting rid of the lead.

AT&T has finally gotten serious over the last few years about building last-mile fiber networks for the future. The company built 500,000 fiber passings in the second quarter of this year to bring it up to 20.2 million fiber passings – with a goal to reach 30 million by the end of 2025. AT&T added 272,000 fiber customers in the second quarter to bring the company to over 7.7 million fiber subscribers. The company is still losing non-fiber customers and dropped 25,000 net broadband customers in the second quarter.

AT&T is late to the game compared to its cellular competitors in selling FWA cellular broadband and just rolled out its Internet Air product in April of this year. AT&T CEO John Stankey characterizes the company’s FWA plans as being used to replace copper infrastructure and perhaps to bid on BEAD grants in remote areas. But for now, the company is far behind Verizon and T-Mobile in selling cellular home broadband. But AT&T recently announced it now signing a ‘few thousand’ FWA customers daily.

It not particularly easy to equate AT&T with some of the recent events in the company, because for all practical purposes, the company has been run by folks from SBC. But a lot of mistakes have been made in AT&T’s name, and it’s somewhat sad to see how far the company has fallen since the early 1980s. AT&T has made mistakes that would have sunk a lot of other businesses, but it is still diverse enoughto generate the cash to keep trying over and over again.